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Territorial Problems of the 
Baltic Basin 

BY /> 



LAURENCE M. LARSON 

Professor ot History 




PRICE TEN CENTS 



PUBLISHED BY THE WAR COMMITTEE 

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 

URBANA 



rtflnW 



IT*?* 



TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS OF THE BALTIC BASIN. 

In these days we often think of seas, rivers, and other waterways as 
natural boundaries separating nations and peoples, and affording a 
certain security against attack and invasion. But in earlier centuries, 
in the age before strategic railways, this was not the prevailing belief. 
Three generations ago the seas were not regarded as barriers: they were 
connecting influences that served to bind states and regions together. 
The sea has always been important as the great highway of commerce, 
and it has also facilitated the exchange of beliefs and ideas. In the 
past, nations have therefore been peculiarly interested in the seas that 
washed their shores, and also in the other shores that were touched by 
the same waters. 

In spite of changed conditions of travel and transport, the interest 
in waterways has persisted. Italy seems anxious to control both 
shores of the Adriatic; and England feels that she must control the 
entire circuit of the Irish Sea. No nation at present can hope to make 
the Baltic Sea its own; but such ambitions have been cherished in the 
past and at times almost realized. Four hundred years ago Denmark 
was the greatest power on the "Eastern Sea." In the seventeenth 
century Sweden developed an even more complete hegemony in those 
waters, but was forced to surrender it to the Russians early in the 
eighteenth century. In recent years Germany has dominated the 
Baltic, and for a year after the Russian collapse the shores and the ship- 
ping of the entire sea was at her mercy. 

It should be noted that Sweden has all her sea coast on these inland 
waters, that Denmark and Prussia have a number of important ports 
on the Baltic, and that in 1914 Russia, too, had a long "window" look- 
ing out upon this same sea. Economically speaking, the Baltic region 
is to a great extent a unit. In the years before the outbreak of the 
Great War the exports of Russia were directed chiefly toward Germany, 
from which country she also drew more than halt ot her imports. The 
commerce of Sweden has always traveled chiefly eastward and south- 
ward, to Russia and to Germany. It is therefore quite natural that 
the peoples occupying the shores of this great waterway should be 
interested in every important change, that appears in any other part of 
the basin. , . 

There was great anxiety in Sweden when the Tsar began to mobil- 
ize, and the Danes trembled when the Kaiser drew the sword But 
now there is chaos in Russia and turmoil in Germany. And out of 



^"^ 



i\-^ 



^-> the confusion that prevails along the eastern and southern shores of 

the Baltic basin have arisen a series of intricate territorial problems, 
some of which appear to be almost incapable of satisfactory solutions. 

North Slcswick 

English and American writers have recently referred to a problem 
of Sleswick-Holstein, to a Danish Alsace-Lorraine, the restoration of 
which is said to be stoutly demanded in Denmark. It happens, however, 
that there is no problem of Sleswick-Holstein, and the Danish Alsace- 
Lorraine is a much smaller area than is usually described by those who 
write on territorial peace problems. P"or a period of four hundred years 
the kings of Denmark were also counts or dukes of Holstein; but Hol- 
stein was never Danish either in race, language, or sentiment, and was 
never a part of the kingdom of Denmark. 

Sleswick, on the other hand, at one time actually did belong to 
Denmark and it is a question whether it was not still a part of the 
kingdom, when the German powers seized the two duchies, Sleswick and 
Holstein, in 1864. There are Danes at present who wish to claim the 
greater part or even the whole of Sleswick on historic grounds, but this 
desire is not general. With the passing of time the southern part of 
the old duchy has become German in speech and sentiment, and the 
Danish people do not care to annex or even to reannex territory the 
population of which is of an alien nationality. 

The case of North Sleswick is wholly different; this region has been 
Danish and Danish only for more than a thousand years. The same is 
true of parts of Mid Sleswick where both the German and the Danish 
nationality are strongly represented. The Danes were glad in 1864 to 
sever the old connection with Holstein; they yielded South Sleswick 
with great reluctance; but the separation from North Sleswick has ever 
since been a source of national grief. 

The fact that Sleswick was not all German was recognized in the 
treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866), by which the emperor of Austria 
yielded his rights in the conquered duchies to the king of Prussia. This 
treaty stipulated that the inhabitants of "the northern districts of 
Sleswick" should be allowed to decide by referendum whether their 
country should continue a part of Prussia or be returned to Denmark. 
No such referendum has ever been allowed. In 1878 Austria released 
Prussia from this obligation; but the Danes of Sleswick insist that the 
pledge is still a binding one and that the right of decision belongs to 
them. 

3 



The problem ot North Sleswick is, therefore, not whether a certain 
territory shall be restored to Denmark, but whether the inhabitants of 
that region shall be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination 
which was promised them more than fifty years ago. 

Time and agam the Danish members in the Reichstag have risen to 
demand a referendum with refusal as the invariable result. During 
the present war German opinion seems to have become more favorable 
to the cause of the inhabitants of North Sleswick, who for more than 
half a century have fought to maintain their nationality; btit the policy 
of the government has been more repressive than ever before: it was a 
criminal act even to mention the Sleswick ciuestion in the public press. 
To discuss the matter at a public meeting was also forbidden. 

But early in October, 1918, the citizens of North Sleswick were in- 
formed by their representative in Berlin that the Prussian regime was 
doomed and that the throne itself was tottering. A week later certain 
important steps were taken preparatory to another demand for a ref- 
erendum. When the German government announced that it was 
willing to accept President Wilson's peace program, the Sleswick Danes 
felt that their day had arrived, and on October 23 the question of their 
future status was brought up in the Reithstag. The secretary for 
foreign affairs, Dr. Solf, denied vigorously that Denmark had any claim 
on any part of the old duchy, but privately he informed the Sleswick 
Danes that the government was disposed to grant their rec|uest. 

A few days after the armistice had become a fact and Germany was 
still in the throes of the revolution, the Slesv/ick Danes took action to 
bring their case before the peace conference. The Electoral Union, 
the political organ of the Danish part of the population, at a meeting 
in Aabenraa (November 16) adopted a series of resolutions in which a 
referendum was demanded and certain conditions laid down of which 
the following are the most important: 

(1) The southern boundary of North Sleswick is ciefined as a line 
beginning at a point a few miles north of Flensborg and drawn in a 
general westerly and slightly northwesterly direction across the penin- 
sula. It is desired that the area north of this boundary shall vote as a 
unit. 

(2) It is also demanded that such adjacent districts in Mid Sleswick 
as may wish to vote on the question of reannexation to Denmark shall 
be permitted to do so. 

(3) All men and women of the age of twenty or above who are 
residents of the districts concerned (except Germans who have lived 

4 



less than ten years in the country) shall he allowed to participate in 
the referendum. Former residents who have been exiled by the Prus- 
sian authorities shall also be allowed to vote. 

The Danish government has been requested to present the case ot 
North Sleswick to the Allied powers and has consented to do so. It 
seems extremely probable that the peace conference will take favorable 
action. That North Sleswick will cast an overwhelming vote tor reun- 
ion with Denmark is beyond question. The referendum, it held, will 
add at least 150,000 persons to the Danish population; if Mid Sleswick 
is also allowed to participate, the number may exceed 200,000. It was 
argued at the Aabenraa conference that the present anarchic conditions 
in Germany are likely to influence the voters of Mid Sleswick very 
strongly in the direction of a choice of allegiance to Denmark. But 
the conference was also agreed that "we must not demand more than 
what is really ours." 

The Kiel Canal 

It has been urged by certain influential English editors and states- 
men that not only the Danish-speaking part of Sleswick but the entire 
province of Sleswick-Holstein should be transferred to Denmark. The 
origin of this suggestion lies in an effort to find a satisfactory solution 
for the problem of the Kiel Canal. I'^or there seems to be a strong 
feeling in certain quarters that Germany must be deprived of the con- 
trol of this waterway. 

The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (usually called the Kiel Canal) begins 
at BrLuisbiittel at the mouth of the Flbe River and terminates at Halte- 
nau on the Baltic Sea, two or three miles north of Kiel. Brunsbitttel 
is in Holstein, while Haltenau is just within the boundary of Sleswick. 
For a distance of twenty miles or more (between Rendsborg and Halte- 
nau) the canal runs very close to or along the border separating the two 
okl duchies; tor a short distance it cuts through what has always been 
Sleswick territory. 

The annexation of the entire province would consequently place the 
Danes in possession of the entire canal. The annexation of Sleswick 
alone might, perhaps, be sufTicient, as it would make the canal an inter- 
national waterway. Such an arrangement would leave the Germans in 
possession of the greater part of it, but the Danes would control the 
Baltic terminal, and they would also share to some extent in the control 
of the traffic on the canal because of its character as a waterway on the 
boundary. Shortly after the armistice had been proclaimed a writer 

5 



in the London Times suggested that the real problem in Sleswick is not 
North but South Sleswick. Though he realized that objections would 
be raised to the plan, he argued that the necessities of the situation de- 
mand that Denmark should assert her right to all of ancient Sleswick. 
South Sleswick might be given a large measure of political and cultural 
autonomy, but it should become an integral part of the Danish king- 
dom. The writer added that the annexation of the whole of Sleswick 
would give Denmark a strategic boundary, of which that country 
seems to be in real need. 

There are, however, several excellent reasons why such a transfer of 
territory should not be made, any one of which should be sufficient to 
defeat the project. 

(1) It violates the principle of nationalism: what is Danish should 
be Danish; what is German must be permitted to remain German. A 
lasting peace cannot be built on the disregard of this principle. It 
South Sleswick should declare her willingness to renew the old allegiance, 
that would be another matter; but such a decision is quite unlikely. 

(2) The Danes do not desire to renew the old relationship with 
Holstein. From its very beginning this connection was a source of 
trouble and even of danger. The revolt of 1848 and the calamities of 
1864 can be traced directly to the plottings of the intellectuals and the 
junkers of Holstein and German Sleswick. But complete annexation, 
such as is suggested at present, would be far more dangerous to Denmark 
than was the old personal union, for it would mean the addition of a 
German element numbering nearly 1,500,000 to a Danish popidation 
counting a little more than 2,700,000. It is quite clear that Denmark 
could not accept a gift of this sort without endangering the peace of 
the kingdom and the future of the Danish nationality. 

(3) The Danes have scarcely sufficient military strength to be 
entrusted with the guardianship of so important a waterway as the 
Kiel Canal. It has been argued that in rime of war it could easily be de- 
stroyed, if the Danes should find themselves unable to hold it. The 
Kiel Canal was, indeed, built for military purposes chiefly; but it is also 
of great commercial value, and it is to the interest of the world that it 
be kept intact. In the past it has been used mainly by German ships, 
but it has also been utilized to some extent by those of other nations. 

(4) It is not possible to find a strategic boundary for Denmark 
that would be of any particular value. Perhaps the most satisfactory 
would be the old "Danework" line between the Sley inlet and the 
Trene River; but this would leave the Kiel Canal wholly within German 

6 



territory. It should be noted that Denmark is broken up into frag- 
ments, all of which can be readily isolated. Real strategic boundaries 
are therefore impossible in this case. 

If the Kiel Canal is to be taken away from the Germans, some form 
of international control will have to be devised. This is by no means 
an ideal arrangement, but it seems likely that the peace conference will 
find many other problems, especially where waterways are in question, 
that will admit of no other solution. 

Finland 

By the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (signed March 3, 1918) the Bolshevik 
government formally surrendered a broad strip of territory lying along 
the western frontier of the Russian empire from the Arctic regions to 
the Sea of Azov. In parts of this great area nationalistic movements 
had been in active progress for some months or years; in others the 
demand for separation from Russia appears to have been artificially 
created to promote the plans of the Pan-Germanists. 

When the armistice was agreed upon last November, one of the 
conditions laid down by the Allies was that the German government 
should repudiate the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Technically, therefore, 
Russia may be said to have recovered her territorial rights in the west 
and southwest, except in the case of Finland, the independence ot 
which was recognized by the Bolsheviki at Brest-Litovsk early in March, 
191 8. But the facts and conditions are not what they were in the earlier 
months of 1918; governments have been set up in the various units 
surrendered at Brest-Litovsk, five or six in all; and some of these are 
likelv to receive recognition at the peace conference. 

Among those that will probably survive is the new state of Finland. 
From 1808 to 1917 the Finns were counted among the subjects of the 
Russian Tsar. Constitutionally Finland was an independent grand 
duchy united with Russia in the person of the emperor; practically this 
meant merely that the grand duchy occupied a privileged position 
among the many dominions of the Tsar. During the last twenty-five 
years of the union the Russians were actively seeking to obliterate all 
traces on Finnish independence and to "Russify" the country. This 
led to determined opposition on the part of the Finns, and when the 
Great War broke out the young men of Finlami left their homes in large 
numbers, stole across the Baltic to .Sweden, and ultimately found their 
way into the German army. 

When tsardom collapsed, early in 1917, the Finns seized the opportu- 
nity to assert their independence. They contended that the union 

7 



with Russia was wholly personal and that when the imperial office was 
abolished, all connection with the Russian government automatically 
terminated. After a period of civil war between the Bolshevik elements 
and the more conservative classes, the middle class groups with the 
assistance of German forces were able to organize a government of the 
conservative type and with leanings towal-d Germany. A monarchical 
form of government was agreed upon and the crown was offered to a 
Hessian prince, a brother-in-law of the Kaiser. Then came the German 
collapse with serious results tor the plans of the Finnish monarchists. 
A change in government became inevitable and the country is at present 
administered by a senate counting seven monarchists and six republi- 
cans. It is significant that the new regent, General Mannerheim, tele- 
graphed his acceptance of the office from London. 

Thus far the French government alone of the Allies has recognized 
the new state. A vigorous propaganda has been carried on to prevent 
further recognition and to induce France to rescind her action; but this 
is not likely to be successful. The probabilities favor the general recog- 
nition of an independent Finland at a reasonably early date. 

The Finnish problem at the peace conference is chiefly one of bound- 
aries. Finland as a political unit is a product of Swedish imperialism. 
The Swedes began their career of conquest east of the Baltic in the 
twelfth century, and they held the grand duchy continually to the 
earlier years of the nineteenth century. But they never came into 
control of all the regions inhabited by Finns: east of their borders lived 
a considerable number of that race (Karelians) who had accepted 
Russian rule and civilization and were adherents ot the Greek Orthodox 
church. 

During the past year the government at Helsingfors has asked 
that all eastern Karelia be transferred to Finland, and that the limits of 
that country be extended eastward to Lake Onega and northward to 
the Arctic Ocean. This suggestion naturally found no favor at Moscow. 
The Bolsheviki, in whom the passions of national feeling and patriotism 
are not strong, might conceivably be induced to surrender the territories 
between Finland and the great lakes; but the great peninsula north of 
the White Sea they will scarcely be willing to yield. The Murman 
(Norman) coast and Kola peninsula are almost without economic value 
and resources; they comprise a vast frozen area almost uninhabited 
except for a few nomadic Lapps anci roving Karelians. But the Mur- 
man coast has an ice-free harbor, and Russia has lost more ports than 
she can afford to lose. 



About sixty miles east ot the Norwegian frontier on Kola Bay lies 
Alexandrowsk (Catherine Harbor) where ships may enter and leave at 
almost any time of the year. In 1915 the serious military situation (the 
Baltic anti the Black Sea were both closed by the enemy) forced Russia 
to carry out an old plan which called for a railway from Petrograd to 
Catherine Harbor. If the claims of the Finnish state are allowed, Rus- 
sia will lose Catherine Harbor and about one hundred and fifty miles of 
the Murman railway. She will have but one remaining port on the 
Arctic: .Archangel, which is ice-bound nine months of the >ear. 

The conflict between Helsingfors and Moscow thus involves two 
separate problems: eastern Karelia and the Murman coast. The Kare- 
lians outside Finland number about 350,000; most of them live between 
the Finnish boundary and the Murman railway. In this case the 
principle of nationalism may perhaps come into collision with the 
principle of self-determination. Being of the same racial stock as the 
western Karelians, they ought, it would seem, to take gladly to the 
suggestion that their country be joined to Finland. But if they are 
allowed to decide by referendum it is not at all sure that they will vote 
to separate from Russia. The civilization of Finland is Swedish and 
the religion is of the Lutheran type; while in eastern Karelia the faith 
and the civilization of Russia have ruled the minds for at least six cen- 
turies. 

The problem of the Murman coast is essentially economic. It 
means that the Finns are determined to secure an outlet on the Arctic, 
which they have never had. As long as Finland promised to remain 
under CJerman influence, the neighboring states of Norway and Sweden 
were reluctant to see Finland extend her territories to the frozen sea; 
but as the situation is at present they are not likely to interpose any 
objections, provided that their own territfiries be left intact. 

The Aland Islands 

Finland has long been a land of strife. Recently it was the bour- 
goisie against the Bolsheviki; earlier it was the Finn contending against 
the Russian; still earlier it was Turanian Finn against Swedish Fin- 
lander. The Swedish element in Finland is not great numerically: 
about 400,000 in a population of about 3,250,000. But it controls to a 
large extent the wealth of the country; in earlier days the Swedes were 
the ruling class, and even at the present day their political influence is 
far out of proportion to their numbers. 

9 



The Swedes probably entered Finland by way of the Aland archi- 
pelago. The Alands are a group of rocks and small islands lying across 
the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia; only one (Aland) is of any appre- 
ciable size. They approach to within twenty miles of the Swedish coast 
and form a natural series of stepping stones to the Finnish mainland. 
Geographically they may be regarded as fragments of the Finnish land 
mass; but they have been inhabited by Swedes as long as their history 
can be traced. There is at present a strong, almost unanimous senti- 
ment on the islands in favor of a reunion with Sweden. 

The material value of the Aland Islands is very slight. The inhabi- 
tants (about 15,000 in number) are chiefly farmers, sailors, and fisher- 
folk, subsisting on what they can wrest from a thin soil or gather from 
the waters about them. The importance of the islands in European 
diplomacy is due to their strategic position with reference to the capi- 
tals of Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The harbor facilities are good 
and the islands possess real possibilities as a military stronghold. The 
Russians soon came to see the advantage of a naval station at Aland and 
erected fortifications at Bomarsund, which were destroyed by the Eng- 
lish and the French in the Crimean War. On the request of Sweden, 
Russia agreed not to rebuild the fortifications, and Aland remained 
unfortified until some time after the outbreak of the Great War. 

As Stockholm is only seventy-five miles distant, any plan to build a 
naval establishment on the Alands is sure to produce uneasiness in 
Sweden. For similar reasons Finland and Russia are anxious that the 
archipelago shall not fall into the hands of the Swedes. Soon after 
the outbreak of the Finnish revolution a Swedish force landed on the 
islands ostensibly to maintain order; but they were soon displaced by 
German garrisons. At Brest-Litovsk it was agreed that the islands 
should belong to Finland, but also that they should never be fortified 
and that the shipping conditions in the waters about them should be 
regulated by a special agreement among the nations most interested: 
Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. 

The efforts of Sweden to gain control of the archipelago and the evi- 
dent desire of the inhabitants to be reunited with the mother country 
has caused much uneasiness and resentment among the Finns. The 
feeling that the Alands must remain a part of Finland is shared by the 
Swedish Finlanders as well as by the Turanian Finns. The former 
have organized a separate political party the object of which is to secure 
Swedish nationalism in Finland and they call loudly to their brethren 

10 



on the islands not to desert them but to remain witii tiiem and help 
them in the struggle that is sure to come. 

The program recently published by the Swedish party in Finland 
■does not promise a wholly peaceful development in the new state. It 
•calls for equal rights for the two languages, Swedish and Finnish, and 
for equal opportunities for each in the schools of the land. It also 
•calls for the creation of new administrative areas in order that the 
regions occupied by Swedish Finknders may be formed into compact 
territorial units. For these units an extensive autonomy is demanded 
and it is also suggested that the Swedish churches should be grouped 
Into a separate diocese. The Swedes also demand what virtually 
amounts to a distinct organization for their part of the army and the 
navy. But these demands (some of them, at least) are sure to meet 
:strenuous opposition from the Turanian Finns. 

The problem of the Aland Islands, though in large part a military 
•consideration, is involved in the nationalistic conflict between Swedes 
and Finns. The Swedish Finlanders cannot afford to weaken their 
•strength by surrendering the islands to Sweden. The Finns on their 
•side are anxious to prevent the Swedish boundary from approaching 
the Finnish mainland. 

The Esthonians and the Letts 

South ot the Gull of Finland lie the Baltic Provinces, a broad strip 
•ot coast land extending to the frontiers of Prussia. There are three 
provinces in this group: Flsthonia, Livonia, and Courland. Their com- 
bined area is about ,^3,000 square miles, and they have a total popula- 
tion of approximately .1,000,000. There is scarcely any other region in 
Europe that offers more serious problems than this strip of coast on the 
•east side ot the Baltic. 

All the great states in the Baltic basin have at some time or other 
held possessions on the eastern shore. In the thirteenth century the 
greater part ot the Provinces was held by the Danes. Later in the 
rsame century came the Teutonic Knights, a crusading order that was 
looking for a new field for their military and religious activities. Dur- 
ing the sixteenth and the seventeenth century the Swedes came into 
possession of Esthonia and Ijvonia, while Courland (1561) was united 
to Poland. I'ltimately the whole region was annexed to Russia. Ex- 
cepting the Danes, whose occupation was for a brief period only, these 
■conquering peoples have left deep traces on the history, the intellectual 
life, and the civilization ot these three little states. 

11 



The earliest known inhabitants of this region were the Letts, an 
ancient people closely related to the Lithuanian stock. The Letts and 
the Lithuanians must have come into this part of Europe long before 
the arrival of either the German or the Slav; their language is very 
ancient: it is said that "almost any Lithuanian peasant can understand 
simple phrases in Sanskrit" (the language of ancient India). 

Soon after the beginning of the Christian era the Finns entered the 
country from central Russia. The Letts and the Finns are still the 
dominant races in the Baltic Provinces. The Letts occupy the country 
•from the Gulf of Riga eastward: Courland and the southern hall of 
Livonia. The Finns (Esthonians) inhabit the remainder of the Prov- 
inces: Esthonia and the northern half of Livonia. There is no longer 
a Livonian people. 

Scattered throughout the three Provinces are small groups of other 
peoples, Germans, Slavs, Swedes, Jews and mixed races. Of these the 
German element is the most important and also the most ancient, 
dating, as it does, from the time when the Teutonic Knights controlled 
the land. Lentil quite recently the German nobility was the land- 
owning class in the rural districts; the German merchants controlled 
the trade in the cities; German scholars manned the institutions of 
higher learning; and German clergymen of the Lutheran faith directed 
the affairs of the church and the primary schools. The Germans com- 
prised only from five to ten per cent of the total population; but their 
importance in the public life of the Letts and the Esthonians was very 
great. 

In the treatv of Brest-Litovsk Lenine and his associates were com- 
pelled to surrender the Baltic shore-land. It is not known just what 
the Prussians intended to do with the Provinces, but it is clear that 
they planned to organize them in such a way as to bring them into 
some sort of a vassal relationship to the German empire. The Prussian 
expansionists realized that it would be unwise to add extensive alien 
elements to the German citizenship; but they believed it possible to 
annex the Baltic lands (with other neighboring regions) to the economic 
system of the Fatherland without seeming to impair their national 
rights. The extension of the German strategic railway system from 
the east Prussian border to the Gulf of Finland, perhaps even to some 
port on the Arctic, and the admission of the Baltic states to the project- 
ed Mid-European tariff union would give the commercial interests of 
Germany an unassailable position on the east coast of the Baltic Sea. 

Economic dependence naturally carries with it a certain measure ot 



political vassalage. Military alliances and the election ot German 
princes to Baltic thrones were also important items in the Pan-German 
program. During the summer of 1918 several princelings from the 
lesser German states held themselves in readiness to accept crowns or 
coronets in the conquered lands. It was reported at one time that the 
Kaiser thought seriously of assuming the title duke of Courland. 

At the conclusion of the recent armistice it was stipulated that the 
Germans should withdraw the forces that were still being kept in regions 
formerly belonging to Russia. When this became known the inhabi- 
tants of the Provinces began to look forward to national independence. 
There was already a working governmental organization among the 
Esthonians, and late in November the Letts proclaimed a republic in 
Riga to be known as Lettland. It was announced that it was to be a 
state primarily for native Letts and that no German Baits were to be 
admitted to office in the ministry. At the same time one Karl Kull- 
mann (or L'llmann) was appointed prime minister; if his name is an 
indication, the new regent of Lettland is surely not innocent of Teuton- 
ic ancestry. 

When the German forces began to retire, the Letts and the Esthon- 
ians suddenly found themselves facing a new danger from the east. 
On the heels of the retreating Teutons came the hosts of the Bolsheviki, 
who had seized the opportunity to begin a vigorous campaign of recon- 
quest. In the neighborhood of Narva the Red army met a decisive 
defeat, however, and the invasion seems, at this writing, to have been 
checked, though perhaps only temporarily. The Finns apparently 
came to the assistance of their Esthonian kinsmen and the Swedes ap- 
pear to have shown some interest in the cause of the Letts. But the 
situation remains very precarious: the Russian forces are evidently 
undisciplined and inefficient; hut they are strong in numbers and it is 
doubtful whether the Baltic levies can defeat another offensive. 

The future of this region is therefore extremely uncertain. There 
are no indications as to how the controlling minds at the peace con- 
ference regard the problems of the old Russian frontier; consequently, 
all that can be done at present is to indicate a few of the more probable 
solutions. 

(1) The Provinces may be restored to Russia. There seems to be 
a Bolshevik element in the Baltic lands which naturally tavors some sort 
of a reunion with the great neighbor to the east. In the earlier days of 
the Lenine regime, the "people's commissioners" depended largely on 
the military services of the "Lettish guard," a force of Lettish soldiers 

13 



with strong revolutionary tendencies. But this element is probablv 
not a numerous one, as the population ot the Provinces is chiefly agri- 
cultural, and the problem of the land has been to some extent solved by 
the extension of a system of peasant proprietorship. 

There is, indeed, something to be said for reunion with Russia. The 
war has left Russia in great need of commercial outlets. The best 
ports on the Black Sea have been seized by the Ukrainians; and in the 
Baltic region a single port remains: Petrograd, which is ice-bound for 
several months of the year. Practically the only ice-free port remain- 
ing within the borders of Russia is Catherine Harbor on the Arctic 
coast. The Bolshevik mind may be deficient in patriotism but it no 
doubt understands the importance of commercial outlets and the 
economic value of ice-free ports. In the Baltic Provinces there are at least 
six fair harbors, all of which have a longer period of navigation than 
Petrograd. Of these the best known is Riga, though it is less important 
than Libau, which is open for navigation every month in the year. 

It is quite evident that Russia needs the Baltic ports, but it is also 
clear that these ports are in real need of Russia. Their prosperity has 
in large measure been built up on the commerce of the vast plain to 
the east and if means should be found to divert this trade to another 
series of ports, there would be economic distress along the whole shore 
from Libau to Narva. 

(2) They may be allowed to organize themselves into two inde- 
pendent states (as appears to be their desire), in which case the common 
boundary would probably be the Salis River, a small stream that ap- 
proximately separates the Esthonian settlements from those of the 
Letts. It is a grave question whether these two peoples have sufficient 
strength and resources to maintain a selt-respecting existence. At the 
highest the population of the proposed Lettland will not exceed 2,000,- 
000, while that of Esthonia will be less than 1,000,000. It would 
seem that such an arrangement must mean serious difficulties in the 
future. 

(3) Esthonia may decide to join Finland. Recent years have seen 
the development of a strong national feeling among the Esthonians, but 
being, after all, a branch of the Finnish race, they ought to be able to 
live in reasonable happiness with their brothers in a greater Finland. 
If the Finns are permitted to annex Karelia to the east and Esthonia 
to the south, their country will have a population of approximately 
5,000,000. 

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(4) The Letts may be asked to join forces with their Lithuanian 
kinsmen in a revived Lithuanian state. Six hundred years ago Lithua- 
nia had a period of greatness, her area covering an extensive region east 
of Poland between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Since then a consid- 
erable part of the Lithuanian race has been absorbed into the Slavic 
mass; there have also been strong currents of emigration from the 
Lithuanian territories to Siberia and to other parts of Russia and even 
to lands across the Atlantic. At present the Lithuanian popula- 
tion in its native territories numbers less than 3,500,000. 

The Lithuanian area is not extensive, perhaps not more than 30,000 
square miles. The future of this region has not been much discussed; 
the organization of a Lithuanian state has been urged and is within the 
realm of the possible; but it is not a promising solution, especially if 
the Letts should insist on establishing a separate state. 

For several centuries the Lithuanians and in part also the Letts 
were subjects of the king of Poland. It is possible that they might be 
induced to renew this historic relationship, though it is doubtful, since 
racially Poles and Lithuanians have nothing in common. They will, 
however, have common rivals and perhaps enemies to the east and the 
west, and such a uTiion may in time be forced by circumstances, as it 
was forced in the middle ages. An arrangement of this sort would add 
considerably to the strength of Poland, and, what is more important, 
it would give the Poles a satisfactory commercial outlet on the Baltic. 

Danzig 

As a result ot the Great War and the consequent readjustment of 
frontiers, several important European states are likely to find them- 
selves deprived of direct access to the sea. These are German .'Austria, 
Hungary, Bohemia (the republic of the Czechs and Slovaks), and 
Poland. In the case of German Austria this condition may be reme- 
died by the admission of the Austrian territories to the new German 
republic; but for Bohemia and Hungary the only solution of this diffi- 
culty appears to be an economic arrangement with some neighboring 
state. 

It is possible, as suggested above, that Poland may be able to reach 
the Sea through the lands of the Letts and the Lithuanians. The Poles 
hope, however, to secure a shorter and more direct route by way of the 
Vistula. Libau and Riga are, indeed, desirable ports; but from the Polish 
viewpoint Danzig at the mouth of the Vistula is the natural outlet. 

The Poles insist that the Vistula is a Polish river and should therefore 

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020 914 553 4 

he under their control throughout its entire course. It is true that 
both banks of this river have a Polish population to a point some dis- 
tance below Thorn or about f)ne hundred miles from its mouth. Along 
the lower course between Thorn and the Baltic, the Polish population 
occupies a narrow tongue of land from twenty to fifty miles wide lying 
along the west bank of the river, while the opposite bank is occupied 
a'most exclusively by Germans. The Poles insist that this strip of 
territory is not only essentially Polish, but is also necessary to their 
economic life and to the successful defense of their covmtry; they de- 
mand, therefore, that it be included in the revived Polish state.- 

This area was for several centuries a part ot the Polish kingdom but 
was taken by the Prussians in the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth 
century. To return what territory is still Polish in speech and senti- 
ment, seems, therefore, a matter of justice merely. There are, however, 
certain facts and conditions that must be taken seriously into account 
before the left bank of the \'istula is definitely handed over to the 
Polish state. 

(1) The tongue of land in question lies wholly within the territory 
of Prussia; if it is annexed to Poland that part of Germany east of the 
Vistula will be separated completely from the rest of the Fatherland. 
It is inconceivable that the Germans will remain satisfied with this 
condition. The Poles are consequently likely to find that the pos- 
session of this strip is a danger as well as an advantage. In case of 
war with Germany it could not be successfully cietended. 

(2) The territory, while largely Polish in population, is not exclu- 
sively so; it has a strong German minority which in certain sections is 
almost as strong as the Slavic majority. This is particularly true of the 
cities where the Germans are, in places, even the more numerous element. 

(3) The region would lose much of its economic value to Poland 
unless Danzig were included. But Danzig is essentially a German 
city, nine-tenths of the population being German in race and speech. 
Through most of its history Danzig has been German rather than 
Polish; though for a long time it was counted as a part of the Polish 
kingdom, its relationship to that state was almost wholly nominal, as 
it enjoyed privileges which made it practically a self-governing republic. 

At the same time it must be remembered that the prosperity of Dan- 
zig is based largely on the great trade that flows toward it from the 
valley of the Vistula. And it must not be forgotten that the disposal 
of the tongue of land between Thorn and Danzig involves the political 
fate of more than 500,000 Poles. 

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